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Abstract: This paper examines the relation between debt, value and dignity in 
the context of the still present European Union debt crisis. It considers dignity 
as a human value and as a moral value. Dignity is namely closely related to a 
human value, dignity and (human) value or worth being synonymous, as well 
as the most important moral value for the European Union, as evidenced from 
the Treaty of Lisbon. It is stated that both in the contexts of labour and of 
debt, the contradictive elements necessity and freedom have a vital impact on 
human dignity, and thus also on human essence (or being) and value as the two 
essential ingredients of dignity. The argument of this paper is that value plays a 
key role for losing dignity or a loss of dignity both in the contexts of labour and 
of debt. Namely, in the context of labour what is critical is the value of things, 
and in the context of (public) debt what is critical is the value of debt, since 
both values are considered to be in a contraposition with the human value or 
the value of man (worker and debtor or rather “debtor”). It is thus reasoned that 
value held primarily in the interests of the economic market is counter to human 
value and human dignity; however, it is not also counter to moral value, as dignity 
is not just a human value but also a moral value. Namely, it is noticed that the 
role of the moral values is to mask the importance of such value held primarily 
in the interests of the economic market on the one side and the simultaneous 
unimportance of the human value on the other side. Thus, although the European 
Union publicly promotes both sides of value, the difference is that the value held 
primarily in the interests of the economic market is being promoted in actuality, 
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whereas human value is being promoted only in words, first and foremost vía 
statements of morality.
 
Key words: human dignity, human value/worth, moral value, (public) debt, 
labour, value of things, value of debt, European Union
The debt crisis in the European Union is still very much present.1 What is most 
strongly affected by it is the concept and praxis of human dignity – as a human 
value and, in a rather peculiar way, also as a moral value. Human dignity is closely 
related to a human value (as well as human essence or being). In Latin, the word 
dignitas, from which the word dignity derives, means both worth and dignified; 
this is, for instance, similar also in the case of the German word, würdig. 
Therefore, dignity and (human) value or worth are synonymous. Human dignity is 
a moral value. In the Treaty of Lisbon, where moral values of the European Union 
are listed, dignity stands in the first place; it is followed by “freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, [...]”.2 Therefore, it could 
be argued that dignity is the most important moral value for the European 
Union. This short paper on the relation between debt, value and dignity, will thus 
consider dignity as a human value as well as a moral value.
 We will open and close our deliberation on dignity as a human value and 
debt with a consideration of a promise. A promise represents a moment when 
debt is incurred and it is interesting that Nietzsche associates promise and thus 
debt with pride3 as another synonym for dignity. He explains that a promise is 
much more than just a promise, it is a right that, among other things, signals 
man’s free will, freedom, autonomy, sovereignty (yet another word very close 
to dignity),4 “mastery over circumstances”,5 “power over [himself] and over 
fate”6 and possession of “his measure of value”.7 Only after the promise (to 
repay the debt) is broken, is the optimism implied by the promise questioned. 
The conscience that was raised by the promise, that is “to be able to stand 
security for his own future”,8 is thus replaced with a bad conscience or guilt, 
that is a main moral concept which originates precisely in the concept of debt 
(the German word Schuld means both debt and guilt), elucidates Nietzsche.9 
However, although the situation from which the promise emerged for Nietzsche 
only at this point becomes undignified, it can be ascertained that the situation 
was already pessimistic and undignified from the start. Namely, a promise and 
thus debt are often a result of a hopeless and undignified situation within the 
existence (or even more hopeless and undignified state of the existence),10 
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which forces one to make a promise and to become indebted; thus the situation 
(or the state) in which debt seems the only way out of this same situation (or 
even this same state). An act of promise is therefore not as much a right that is 
connected with freedom, et cetera, but rather it is a constraint that is connected 
with necessity, et cetera. More than this, an act of promise is a rather humiliating 
and undignified act, a sign of powerlessness, inequality and inferiority, and the 
beginning of a slavery – a slavery in the context of debt. Thus it is true that 
after debt is incurred, the situation within the existence (or even the state of 
the existence) can become even harder than it was before, since it can turn into 
the state of indebtedness – as a result of either a (long-lasting) paying off the 
debt or of a broken promise, because of an (final) inability to repay the debt. 
This means that if the situation within the existence (or even more the state of 
the existence) that was already before indebtedness hostile to human dignity, 
after indebtedness turns into the state of indebtedness it becomes even more 
threatening to attainment of dignity. The difference thus occurs because of 
differing risks of losing dignity or a loss of dignity. Namely, whereas the state 
presents a greater risk of losing dignity or a loss of dignity vis-à-vis the situation 
– if we suppose that both situation and state are marked with hard existential 
conditions –, because it is connected with a longer period of time and is thus 
even harder to suffer as well as being even harder to get out of it, the state of 
indebtedness presents an even greater risk of losing dignity or a loss of dignity 
vis-à-vis the state (or the state of the existence), because one is not burdened 
just with material worries, but also with the pressure of debt. Therefore, in our 
deliberation, debt will not be connected with the presence of human dignity and 
value, but rather with the absence of human dignity and value.
 Our argument proceeds from the statement that dignity is something that 
is present at first, but might therefore be lost later. Human beings at first have 
dignity, but might later on be losing or lose it.11 The concept and praxis of labour 
is crucial for the question of losing dignity or a loss of dignity, since labour is 
one of the main fields of human existence (the other being love) and, as Arendt 
elaborates,12 has always been situated between two contradictive elements, 
necessity and freedom. However, it is also similar in the case of debt, as for 
both labour and debt it can be ascertained that they generally arise out of an 
existential necessity and that they both enslave. And since the human being first 
and foremost is not free from necessity and is rather enslaved by it, he is also 
enslaved by a master, employer, capitalist, creditor, Capital, et cetera, and is thus 
at risk of losing his dignity or a loss of his dignity. Therefore, whereas unfreedom 
or slavery (as one pole) is attributed to inequality, inferiority, unworthiness and 
absence of dignity, as well as suffering and unhappiness (discontent), autonomy 
or sovereignty or freedom (as another pole) is attributed to equality, worthiness 
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and presence of dignity, as well as unsuffering and happiness (content). Thus, 
if necessity and freedom have a vital impact on human dignity, they also have a 
vital impact on the two essential ingredients of dignity, the human essence (or 
being) and value.13 
 The argument of this paper is that value plays a key role for losing dignity 
or a loss of dignity, in the contexts of both labour and of debt. Whereas, when 
referring to Marx,14 in the context of labour – only concerning the value clarified 
and extremely simplified – what is critical is the value of things, which is in a 
contraposition with the value of man (worker), in the context of (public) debt 
– again, only concerning the value clarified and extremely simplified – what is 
critical is the value of debt, which is in a contraposition with the value of man 
(debtor or rather “debtor”).15 Namely, in both cases value is transferred from 
man (value of man; internal) to the value that is posited counter to him (value of 
things or value of debt; external); in the case of labour that is the surplus value 
(excess or over the limit), and in the case of debt that is the value to repay the 
debt (until the limit). Therefore, human value and counter value are opposite in 
proportion to each other and the logic is such: the higher the human value, the 
lower the counter value, and conversely, the higher the counter value, the lower 
the human value. More than this, the lower the human value, the more a man 
suffers and is devaluated, unequal, inferior, worthless, enslaved, dehumanized 
and undignified. This is because whereas human value is closely related to 
dignity and has a positive effect on dignity, counter value is violently counter 
dignity and has a negative effect on dignity. Because the higher human value 
means a stronger sense of one’s own value and a better chance for the presence 
of dignity, whereas the higher counter value means a weaker sense of one’s own 
value and a better chance for the absence of dignity. Therefore, if human value 
would be enough important and properly appreciated, then man’s situation 
within existence (or even state of existence) would not be so hard and miserable, 
man would not suffer and would not be unhappy (discontent), worthless, 
dehumanized and undignified, but would be happy (content) and would have 
his worth, humanity and dignity. However, the value of things or the value of 
debt again and again prevails over the value of man; while on the economic 
market16 the impersonal counter value is (more) free and (more) valuable, a 
person (worker, debtor or rather “debtor”) is unfree, enslaved and worthless. A 
man therefore is neither free nor autonomous or sovereign, but is in the context 
of labour – as Marx would say – a slave to the capitalist (personal) and in the 
context of debt – as Lazzarato would say – a slave to Capital (impersonal). 
 In the context of labour Marx and Engels, in a critical remark about the 
bourgeoisie, explicitly and most illuminatingly refer to dignity (namely, the 
word worth from the following citation is, once again, synonymous with the 
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word dignity): “It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place 
of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, 
unconscionable freedom – free trade”.17 However, once again this is also similar 
for the case of debt as for dignity both in the contexts of labour and debt it 
can be ascertained that was resolved into exchange value, since the value of 
man is exchanged for the value of things (bourgeoisie)18 or the value of debt 
(governments). Thus, for both workers (proletariat) and debtors or rather 
“debtors” it could be asserted that they are in the first place fighting exactly for 
dignity, although they have different modalities of achieving it: whereas workers 
want to gain a better wage,19 debtors or rather “debtors” want to achieve a 
payment or rather write-off of a debt. Namely, a higher wage ensures a higher 
chance to preserve or attain dignity, because of a smaller gap between the value 
of man (worker) and the value of things, and a lower or rather null debt ensures 
a higher chance to preserve or attain dignity, because of a smaller gap between 
the value of man (debtor or rather “debtor”) and the value of debt. But since 
workers are above all enslaved vía the capitalist, who is a person, and “debtors” 
are above all enslaved vía Capital (public debt), which is impersonal, the struggle 
in the context of public debt is even harder than the struggle in the context of 
labour. As the struggle in the context of (public) debt is also harder – since vía 
Nietzsche was explained that promise and debt are in close proximity to morality 
– because – like it will be noted (also) vía Lazzarato the next moment – “‘labour’ 
is doubled with ‘work on the self’”,20 which is attributed to morality. Thus today 
everyone, whether the worker or the workless, et cetera,21 is “responsible and 
guilty for his own fate”,22 as Lazzarato also maintains.
 In the European Union, where the debt crisis is still very much present, 
today practically everyone should thus feel “responsible and guilty for his 
own fate”.23 This occurs even though none one of us (the people) has actually 
made any promise and that the debt and the feeling of responsibility and guilt 
were therefore imposed on us – by those that have indeed made the promise 
(governments), that is allowed the (public) debt, and others involved (banks, 
European troika of creditors, et cetera); therefore, those who have incurred the 
(public) debt. It is not that we (the people) did not have the right to make the 
promise, but rather that we did not have the need to make the promise. The 
others were those that had the need (banks, governments, European troika, 
et cetera) and who took their right (governments) to make the promise, even 
though they did not have the right to do so. Consequently an inversion regarding 
the situation (or the state) has occurred. Namely, whereas their (banks, et 
cetera) situation (or state) was before the promise hopeless and undignified 
and is now much more full of hope, ours (the people) was much more full of 
hope and dignified before and became much more hopeless and undignified 
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only after, since it turned into the state marked with indebtedness; while they 
who have incurred the debt (banks and/or governments and/or European troika 
of creditors, et cetera) are (even) now free, autonomous and sovereign and 
have the “mastery over circumstances”24 and “power over [themselves] and 
over fate”,25 we (the people) are now (even more) unfree, not autonomous and 
sovereign and have (even less) “mastery over circumstances”26 and “power over 
[ourselves] and over fate”.27, 28 This means, with their guilty promise they who 
incurred the debt stood security just for their own future, whereas they did not 
care about ours, as Nietzsche also attests. But in spite of all this tremendous and 
notorious injustice and devastation at least one thing is clear, namely, the more 
we are losing our worth and dignity, the more are they also losing their worth 
and dignity; because the promise was ab initio imbued with guilt and immorality. 
 Nevertheless, in the Treaty of Lisbon, where moral values are listed, 
dignity stands in the first place and is thus the most important moral value for 
the European Union, albeit the obvious fact being that those who declared this 
are doing everything against guaranteeing it in actuality. What is most strongly 
affected by the debt crisis is precisely human dignity for not just individuals, 
but whole nations are losing their dignity or have lost their dignity; because 
if the value of debt is counter to the human value, it is also counter to human 
dignity. However, although dignity is not just a human value but also a moral 
value, it only seems like the value of debt is counter also to the moral value. 
Namely, it can be noticed that the role of the moral values is merely to mask the 
importance of such value held primarily in the interests of the economic market 
on the one side and the simultaneous unimportance of the human value on the 
other side. Because while value held primarily in the interests of the economic 
market is counter to the human value, moral value has a task to mask the lack of 
human value. So, the European Union is, despite the incompatibility of the value 
held primarily in the interests of the economic market and the human value, 
publicly still promoting both sides of value. However, the difference is that the 
value held primarily in the interests of the economic market is being promoted 
in actuality, whereas human value is being promoted only in words, first and 
foremost vía statements of morality. The European Union is consequently trying 
to fill the void of dignity with morality, where dignity as a human value (actual 
dignity) is being substituted with dignity as a moral value (illusive dignity); 
meaning that the more dignity as a moral value is present in words, the more this 
demonstrates that dignity as a human value is not present in actuality. Therefore, 
it is about time for European Union to think seriously about not only its priority 
concerning values (that is, about the value of the value held primarily in the 
interests of the economic market on the one side and the value of the human 
value on the other side), but also about the purpose of such documents as the 
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Treaty of Lisbon and thus to finally put the right value in the first place not only 
in words, but also in actuality.
 Although, as we have said before together with Nietzsche, they who 
incurred the debt are the ones who stood security for their own future, they 
are not as well the ones who possess the “measure of value”.29 Rather, we are 
the ones who in spite of everything possess the “measure of value”,30 since we 
are, just as Nietzsche remarks, “bound to reserve a kick for the feeble windbags 
who promise without the right to do so, [...]”,31 as well as for the others involved. 
Because they are the ones who have the (second and most difficult) debt, as 
they owe us our worth and dignity that we have already lost or are still losing 
while paying off their original debt. 
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